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Abstract 
Russian hydrocarbon resources are a major source of energy for the European Union, 
natural gas in particular.  Controlling energy flow gives Russia powerful leverage and Russia 
continues to use this to its geo-political advantage.  Although the Russian economy is heavily 
dependent on revenue from EU consumers, this has not prevented energy monopolies from 
becoming involved in diplomacy.  Since President Vladimir Putin ascended to power in 2000, 
Russia’s energy giants have been used by the State to play a more aggressive role in influencing 
politics in neighboring countries.  Since Poland joined the European Union in 2004, it has been 
vocal and influential on energy policy.  Despite Poland’s contributions, a unified response to 
threats to European energy security is still lacking.  On the contrary, Russia’s use of energy 
giants like Gazprom has been much more successful and in providing President Putin with a 
strategic advantage.  This advantage has not only manifested itself in successful energy 
monopolies abroad, but also in Putin’s reshaping of Russian nationalism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 RUSSIA, THE EU, AND HYDROCARBON RESOURCES 
Hydrocarbon resources are a crucial source of revenue for the Russian economy, but over 
the last quarter of a century they have not only supported critical growth and recovery, paid off 
foreign debt, and contributed to developing financial reserves, but they have also morphed into a 
tool for diplomacy.1  Energy relations with Europe, which has its roots in post-World War II 
1950’s, have increased in scale and relevance with each passing year.2   After the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU) launched another series 
of agreements and have cooperated on many large-scale energy projects, such as Nord Stream.  
For both Russia and the EU, energy independence is unlikely, mutual dependence is 
acknowledged, and over-dependency is avoided.  The goal is to secure not only energy or 
revenue, but also an economic and geo-political advantage.  For Russia, a series of bilateral 
agreements with European nations is natural, but conversely, the European Union continues to 
struggle to achieve real convergence when it comes to energy policies from Member States.  
Since its 2004 accession, though, Poland has made some valuable contributions toward ‘energy 
solidarity’ within the EU.  Though the EU has made enormous progress in cultivating 
cooperation in Europe, there are still some fundamental inconsistencies, which have become 
more obvious as the conflict in Ukraine has escalated.  This work will discuss the relationship 
between Russia and Europe as it relates to natural gas, Russia’s energy strategy, Europe’s energy 
goals, and the implications of energy trade between the EU and Russia. 
 
                                                
1 Jeronim Perovic, Robert W. Orttung, and Andreas Wenger. Russian Energy Power and Foreign 
Relations: Implications for conflict and cooperation. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1. 
2 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 91. 
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CHAPTER 1 
RUSSIAN SUPPLY AND EUROPEAN DEMAND 
Since the 1950’s Russia has been engaged with Eastern European nations in the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as an energy supplier, and then starting in the 1960’s 
as a supplier of gas and oil to Western Europe. Germany and the Soviet Union established the 
foundation of their energy relations with the “Gas for Pipes” program in the early 1970s that 
capitalized on German production efficiency and the rich natural resources in Russia and the 
Soviet Union.3  As the EU continued to expand, the need for a more unified vision of energy 
strategy became clear.  The 1997 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed between 
the EU and Russia included a focus on energy.  This section under Article 65 provides: “The 
cooperation shall include among others the following areas:  the improvement of the quality and 
security of energy supply, in an economic and environmentally sound manner, […].”4  This was 
also the year that industrialized countries across the globe signed and adopted the United Nations 
Kyoto Protocol on December 11, 1997, which called on developed nations to reduced carbon 
emissions; Russia signed two years later.5 
Although the ethics of a responsible energy policy are kept in mind, Russia and the EU 
clearly recognize the other benefits from this supply and demand relationship.  Russia’s economy 
depends on the revenue generated by state-owned energy giants to keep the economy afloat, 
while Europe simply does not possess enough hydrocarbon resources to generate sufficient 
power on its own.  Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, head of the Industrial and Technological 
                                                
3 Nina Poussenkova, “The Global Expansion of Russia’s Energy Giants.” Journal of 
International Affairs 63:2 (2010):104. (‘Gas for Pipes’ was an agreement between West 
Germany and the USSR that was an exchange of German steel pipes for Soviet gas exports.) 
4 European Council and Commission. “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: Decision 
97/800/EC,” Official Journal of the European Communities 40 (1997): 22.  
5 United Nations Framework on Climate Change, “Kyoto Protocol,” (1997).  
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Trends Section of the Strategic Affairs Directorate in the French Ministry of Defence, projected 
that by 2025 the EU will not even be able to supply 25% of its natural gas demand with 
European resources.6  Despite the fact that the EU invests in many renewable energy initiatives, 
it is not yet a total replacement for traditional hydrocarbon energies.  Nuclear energy is currently 
the only option, but it would be expensive to implement, not to mention the fact that it is so hotly 
debated.7  
 In addition to providing stabilizing revenue for the Russian economy, hydrocarbon 
revenue has allowed for a certain shaping of the Russian mentality.  Jeronim Perovic, senior 
researcher at the Institute of History at the University of Basel and scholar at the Center for 
Security Studies at ETH Zurich, takes this one step further and claims that “this new wealth 
marks a very significant development, since it means that Russia feels it is no longer beholden to 
the West and can pursue a more ‘independent’ foreign policy line.”8  His colleague, Philip 
Hanson, who served as an Economic Affairs Officer for the United Nations and has published 
extensively on the Russian economy, warns that this may also cause an overly optimistic view of 
the Russian economy in that this increase in wealth could cause entities like the Russian Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade to take too much of a ‘Pollyanna perspective’ and fail to 
recognize the overdependence on natural gas and oil and lack of economic diversity in other 
sectors.9  Though he avoids calling Russia a ‘petro-state,’ Hanson points out that more than any 
increase in real production, the increased revenues result from charging non-CIS states higher 
and higher prices. He notes that in 2006, oil and gas production compose “a quarter of Russia’s 
                                                
6 Christophe-Alexandre Paillard, “Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence,” Journal of 
International Affairs 63:2 (2010): 69. 
7 Ibid., 65. 
8 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 1. 
9 Ibid., 23. 
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GDP, three-fifths of its exports, and half of the federal budget respectively.”10  Nina 
Poussenkova, chair of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Economics and Energy Policy Program, 
though, does not hesitate to proclaim Russia as a petro-state, and furthermore claims that some of 
these energy monopolies play the role of “petroleum ambassador of Russia.”11  
Russia has been criticized for the perceived use of gas and oil to influence neighboring 
countries, especially those that belonged to the former Soviet Union.  Paillard states that “Russia 
has the means and the political will to create new routes and to make countries favorably 
disposed to its economic and political interests, regardless of European policy.”12At the same 
time, though, it cannot be ignored that there is a very real mutual dependency between Russia 
and Europe.  Europe depends on Russian gas, and Russia depends on the revenue from gas 
exports to Europe. Domestic gas prices in Russia are much lower than world market prices.  
Charging a market price to Russian consumers in the near future may not be feasible.  There are 
several theories why Russia continues to subsidize domestic energy, especially gas, such as that 
from Robert W. Orttung, the author of Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: 
Implications for Conflict and Cooperation (2009), who proposes, “[…] high oil and gas revenues 
allow states to spend more money on direct subsidies to the population, thereby reducing the 
demands for democratization.”13  Orttung suggests that the Russian government not only uses 
Russia’s hydrocarbon resources for influencing foreign policy goals, but to mollify its own 
population and possibly even to dissuade full and open democratic participation, which is 
possible through government purchase and control of major media outlets and selective funding 
                                                
10 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 27. 
11 Poussenkova, “Russia’s Energy Giants,” 104. 
12 Paillard, “Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence,” 70. 
13 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 61-2. 
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of pro-government initiatives.14  An additional benefit of charging higher energy prices to 
European customers is that a portion of the revenue is directed to the Russian government’s 
Stabilization Fund, which fairly successfully utilizes a reserve of energy profits as a tool to 
manage inflation and the fluctuation of world energy prices.15 
With these propositions in mind, it would seem that Russia has a need to diversify its risk 
of over-dependence on a single customer base just as much as Europe needs to diversify the risk 
of over-dependence on a single supplier.16  Paillard presents a 2008 statistic that illustrates the 
relationship, more clearly: Russian exports may be only 25 to 30 percent of Europe’s gas 
imports, but that this is around 90 percent of Russia’s exports.17  By 2013, though, the EU 
decreased that percentage to 17.5%.18  Hanson offers that Russian policy makers are more 
inclined to push for the development of more domestic nuclear energy and coal usage as oil and 
gas production slow, because gas exports to high paying customers in Europe are the main driver 
in the Russian economy.19 Reducing domestic gas consumption would free up revenue- 
generating resources for export.  Furthermore, he suggests that the threat of Russia’s use of 
energy as soft power might be over exaggerated. He writes,  
[…] Russia is unlikely to seek deliberately to curtail oil or gas exports to Europe 
for foreign-policy reasons, short of an acute crisis in relations.  The risk to 
revenues and to business reputation would be very great.  The greater problem for 
Europe, almost certainly, is Russia’s future capacity to deliver more.20 
 
                                                
14 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 60. 
15 Ibid., 63. 
16 Ibid., 2. 
17 Paillard, “Russia and Europe’s Mutual Energy Dependence,” 70. 
18 European Council.,“Natural gas consumption statistics.” Last modified August 10, 2014. 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Natural_gas_consumption_stati
stics.  
19 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 39.  
20 Ibid., 40. 
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This refers to the challenges that Russia faces developing additional reserves such as those 
located in Siberia and the Arctic, where extraction is complicated by the extreme climate and 
lack of existing infrastructure.  Beginning in the 1990s, though, Russia has exerted its influence 
in Central Asia to purchase gas from countries with existing infrastructure, such as Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan, at low prices, which it later sells on European markets at significantly higher 
prices.21  This is unlikely to be a secure long-term strategy, but may function as long as Russia’s 
influence prevails in that region.22 
 Natural gas is a major part of the European energy mix, and continues to gain popularity 
because it is cleaner than coal or oil, thereby aiding European Union Member States to achieve 
their ambitious carbon emissions standards.  Unfortunately, the EU itself does not possess 
sufficient natural gas reserves and is heavily reliant upon imports. This makes the EU both a 
valuable customer and a vulnerable customer.  The EU imports a considerable amount of natural 
gas from Russia, but in order to achieve diversity in supply as well as the EU goals of  “20-20-20 
by 2020”, which stands for a 20% reduction in carbon emission, a 20% increase in renewable 
energy, and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency by the year 2020 from the levels in 1990, 
the EU needs to seriously re-evaluate its energy strategy.23  The EU has made steps toward these 
targets and reduced their gas imports from Russia from 2012 to 2013 from 30.9% down to 17.5% 
of total gas imports.24 During this same time the percentage of total natural gas consumption fell 
by 0.4% and production fell by 0.7%.25   
                                                
21 Poussenkova, “Russia’s Energy Giants,” 104. 
22 Ibid.,107, 117. 
23 European Commission. “Energy 2020: A strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure 
energy,” (2010): 2. 
24 European Council. “Natural gas consumption statistics.”  
25 Ibid. 
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A notable element of the energy relationship between the EU and Russia is that they do 
not operate off of one agreement with the EU as one entity; rather it consists of numerous 
bilateral agreements with EU nations, their energy companies, and Russian energy giants such as 
Gazprom.  These EU Member States possess varying levels of energy dependence and 
vulnerability.26  The development of contemporary Russian energy giants like Gazprom has a 
history of progress and regress that creates an additional layer of complexity.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 46. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROPERTY OWNERSHIP AND STATE-RUN COMPANIES 
Energy companies in Russia were not always so successful.  After the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union, privatization of state-controlled entities allowed for citizens to use a voucher 
system to purchase shares of companies, or in some cases entire entities, often at very low prices.  
At the same time, though, many of those same companies had been loss-producing during the 
Soviet Era.  Many required serious restructuring in order to make any returns, especially after the 
prevalence of asset stripping by managers and officials in a ‘bank run’ fashion that many Soviet 
enterprises suffered at the uncertainty of the future of the Soviet Union.27   
Some of the most profitable enterprises included Russian raw resources, most notably 
hydrocarbons.  Cases of successful turnaround created a new elite class of ‘oligarchs.’28  Dr. 
Anders Aslund, world-renowned economist specializing in post-communist economic 
transitions, recounts that, “opinion polls show that oligarchs are the most hated people in Russia.  
As a consequence, the public condoned the Kremlin’s lawless confiscation through taxation of 
Russia’s biggest and best oil company, Yukos […].”29  This small, educated group of almost 
exclusively men were able to, as Aslund puts it, “[make] their fortunes on the reanimation of 
existing Soviet mastodons rather than developing new enterprises.”30  Privatization was critical 
in the survival of these companies, but during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, there has been 
an increase in the re-nationalization of these enterprises, including the ‘acquisition’ of companies 
such as Yukos, Sibneft, the Kovykta gas fields, and Gazprom.  Oligarchs, not limited to the 
                                                
27 Steven L. Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 7. 
28 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 54. 
29 Anders Aslund,  How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia, and Central Asia.  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 257. 
30 Ibid., 259. 
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energy sector,  who opposed Putin’s actions were stripped of their assets, and were forced into 
exile or imprisoned include Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
31  Furthermore, Orttung claims that Putin’s logic behind this trend that, “whoever controls the 
oil, controls the country.  And therefore, whoever controls the country inevitably tries to gain 
control over oil.”32  Obviously, Putin was not ready to share power with these entrepreneurial 
businessmen.  From 2003 to 2007, world market prices for oil continued to rise, which also 
meant that natural gas prices, which are pegged to oil prices, also rose.  As a result, there was a 
consistent increase in revenue to the Russian government that in turn became increasingly more 
authoritarian as political support for a price increased, President Putin reclaimed privatized 
industries, and as Orttung further explains it, “ In this sense, the high oil prices have facilitated 
the existing predilection away from political freedom.”33   
Property Rights and the Russian Energy Sector 
The development of the energy sector in Russia deserves more attention.  Heiko Pleines, 
researcher and author of numerous pieces dealing with the energy sector and CIS, as well as the 
Head of the Department of Politics and Economics at University of Bremen, has an interesting 
position on the topic of state-run energy companies, believing that the ownership is actually less 
influential on the company than many might argue.  He acknowledges Norway’s nationalized 
and highly productive energy sector and attempts to account for its success. He states,  
If there is a functioning market with clear rules and property rights, companies are 
likely to operate efficiently.  If not, they tend to engage in asset-stripping rather 
than long-term development.  The role of the state is thus crucial: the state can 
work to improve the efficiency of private and state owned companies by 
                                                
31 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 58.       
32 Ibid., 54. 
33 Ibid., 55. 
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subjecting them to market pressure through the establishment of clear rules of the 
game and secure property rights, or it can become a factor of instability itself.34 
 
This correlation between weak property rights and instability has also been studied by Steven L. 
Solnick in his book Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (1998).  His 
analysis characterizes Soviet style property rights with the following observation: “ In the 
absence of clear legal or procedural norms for third-party resolution of property rights conflicts 
(and the Soviet system clearly lacked these), the principle of ownership could only be 
demonstrated by the fact of control.”35  The post-Soviet Russian state has used several tactics to 
regain control of companies including making claims of tax evasion, selectively enforcing the 
rule of law, and by using coercive methods against their targets and their supporters, such as 
threats, fines, frozen assets, and revoked visas.36  The Yukos Affair exemplifies these tactics, 
where Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other top managers of Yukos were investigated for tax 
evasion and as a result, they were either arrested or fled the country. Other energy companies 
experienced similar accusations, but some avoided the consequences by negotiating and 
acquiescing to takeovers by state-controlled energy monopolies. 37  Khodorkovsky was only 
released in December 2013, just weeks before the start of the Winter Olympics hosted by Russia 
in Sochi, in what seems to have been more of a publicity stunt than a result of the due process of 
law.  
Russia’s “Gas Giant”: Gazprom 
Russia’s largest energy giant is Gazprom.  Gazprom is a state-owned and operated 
company that, after the 2006 Federal Law on Gas Export, became the only Russian natural gas 
                                                
34 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 72. 
35 Solnick, Stealing the State, 30. 
36 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 77-8. 
37 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations,76-7. 
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company with the legal right to export Russia’s natural gas supplies.38  Though the company was 
the result of the privatized energy sector, by the early 2000s, the Russian government reacquired 
the majority of the ownership.39  It is the world’s largest natural gas producer, a company with 
nearly 350 subsidiaries.40 Gazprom established working relationships with European nations 
including Germany, France, Finland and Italy by the mid-1990’s.  Nina Poussenkova calls 
Gazprom’s relationship with Germany’s energy giant Wintershall, “Gazprom’s greatest 
breakthrough in Europe,” and Germany continues to be a preferred partner in Europe.41  She 
describes the ties between Gazprom and the Kremlin as initially having more business-focused 
relationship in developing foreign markets for Russian hydrocarbons, but that this changed and 
“in the 2000s Gazprom has become the Kremlin’s faithful servant and dangerous sword, and the 
Kremlin has become Gazprom’s protector.”42  Poussenkova notes, however, that sometimes 
“Support provided by Russia's leadership to the international expansion of Russian energy 
companies, however, has sometimes backfired, as even pure business initiatives were perceived 
as being Kremlin-controlled.”43 Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny state that, “The 
Russian energy sector has been transformed from a supporting factor of the Soviet military-
industrial complex into a mechanism of soft power that allows this country to extend its 
influence over the states which source their hydrocarbons from it.”44   Many of those key states 
are in the EU. 
 
                                                
38 “Strategy Implementation,” Gazprom, www.gazprom.com  
39 Perovic et al., Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations, 54. 
40 “Subsidiaries List,” Gazprom. www.gazprom.com  
41 Poussenkova, “Russia’s Energy Giants,” 107. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid.,121. 
44 Stefan Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny, “Landscapes of Paradox: Public Discourses and 
Policies in Poland’s Relationship With the Nord Stream Pipeline,” Geopolitics 15:1-21 (2010): 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EU ENERGY OBJECTIVES AND PIPELINE POLITICS 
The flagship goal of the EU in the energy sector is the “20-20-20 by 2020.”  This target 
was originally included in the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, and adopted through the EU Energy 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan, which was presented by the Commission in 2008.45 This 
was followed by the Commission’s “Energy 2020” in 2009, which provides a detailed plan.  
Energy 2020 even looks forward to the goals of “Energy 2050”, including a 95% reduction in 
carbon emissions from the 1990 level by 2050. 46 
As a major energy importer, the EU intends to decrease its need for fossil fuels, which 
will not only help to achieve the environmental results of 20-20-20 but also, more importantly, 
will push the EU to diversify its energy sources, and ultimately strengthen energy and national 
security.  In 2006, the EU as a whole imported s 61% of its natural gas, with 42% of that coming 
from Russia; 24% from Norway; 18% from Algeria; and 16% from other various countries.47  
The EU Energy and Solidarity Action Plan draws attention, though, to the fact that several 
member states are 100% reliant on one energy provider outside of the EU, namely Russia.  This 
is a major concern, especially when considering the impacts of past disruption of energy supplies 
due to political events, accidents, and natural disasters. The Commission states that, “While each 
Member State is responsible for its own security, solidarity between Member States is a basic 
feature of EU membership. […] National Solutions are often insufficient [but] the combined 
                                                
45 European Commission, “An EU Security and Solidarity Action Plan,” (2008): 2, accessed 
November 1, 2013, 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0781:FIN:EL:PDF 
46 European Commission, “Energy 2020,” 3. 
47 European Commission, “Energy Security and Solidarity,” 4. 
13 
 
 
weight of the EU in world affairs can be more effective.”48  It allows for latitude for Member 
States to pursue individual energy policies, but simultaneously urges all Member States to 
uphold a common vision for Europe.   
The Five Points of the EU Energy Security and Solidarity focus on: 1. Infrastructure 
needs and diversification of energy supplies; 2. External energy relations; 3. Oil and gas stocks 
and crisis response mechanismsEnergy efficiency; 4. Energy efficiency; and 5. Making the best 
use of the EU’s indigenous resources.49  In addition, the EU and Member States must continue to 
work with suppliers and transit countries, but keeping in mind that real security will be achieved 
when the EU will be able to generate more domestic energy through wind, solar, hydro, biomass, 
and marine resources, while continuing to develop indigenous fossil fuels.50 
Innovative New Route: Nord Stream 
Although the EU advocated the cultivation of new energy supplies and suppliers, it has also 
endorsed the expansion of supply routes.  The Nord Stream Pipeline is the premier example of 
this in the Northern Corridor.  One of the first projects of its kind, Nord Stream is a natural gas 
pipeline that runs beneath the Baltic Sea and supplies Germany with Russian natural gas.  Nord 
Stream includes two gas pipelines originating from the Yuzhno-Russkoye field, exiting at 
Vyborg, Russia, and then traveling through the Baltic Sea and entering Germany at Greifswald. 
Nord Stream has two key partners, Russia and Germany, but it is also supported to a much lesser 
extent by the Netherlands.51   
                                                
48 Ibid., 3. 
49 EU, “Energy Security and Solidarity,” 3. 
50 Ibid.,13. 
51 Robert L. Larsson, “Security Implications of the Nord Stream Project,” A briefing paper to 
European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs published by the European Parliament, 
Brussels, (2008): 2. 
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Russian energy giant, Gazprom, spearheaded this large-scale project.  Gazprom is the 
majority stakeholder with 51%, German company, Wintershall Holding 15.5%, German 
company, E. On 15.5%, Dutch Gasunie 9% and French GDF Suez 9%.  The first natural gas 
supplies from Russia to Germany via this route began November 8, 2011, through the first of the 
two 1224 km long pipelines and the shipments through the second began a year later. If both 
lines run at full capacity, Nord Stream would have the potential to supply 55 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas per year and drafts for possible third and fourth lines are under consideration.52 
The idea of an underwater pipeline became more and more attractive to the partners 
because it eliminated the need to pay to pass though transit countries, as most traditional land-
based pipelines require. According to the Gazprom website, “Nord Stream will provide 
customers in Western Europe with the most reliable gas deliveries.”53  It connects the resources 
directly to the customers and bypassing intermediaries.  Although avoiding transit states may 
seem like a simple solution, the underwater pipeline was not only technically challenging, but 
also triggered heated discussions on the economic, political, and environmental implications.   
 Baltic Member States opposed the pipeline under the Baltic Sea for the potential risks.  
Some feared that the scale of the construction to might have upset the ecosystem, which supports 
the fishing industry, and is also used for shipping and recreation.  Also during this time, Estonia 
was in the midst of a political controversy with Russia following the relocation of a Soviet Era 
monument.  Moving the ‘Bronze Soldier’ resulted in backlash from Estonia’s large Russian 
population and Russia as well.  This contributed to Estonia’s refusal to cooperate to allow the 
                                                
52 “Nord Stream,” Gazprom, last modified June 27, 2014, 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipelines/nord-stream/. 
53 Ibid.  
15 
 
 
pipeline to run along its coast.54  Sweden also had its own reservations about Nord Stream and 
was not convinced that having a Russian underwater gas pipeline or service station within its 
waters was beneficial. Sweden indicated that having a pipeline with a staffed service platform 
near its coast might create the potential scenario that “Russian intelligence would use the 
platform.”55  President Putin had already advised that he would deploy Russia’s Baltic Sea Navy 
to provide security for the project, but other than collecting geospatial, subsurface, and various 
technical measurements, there is no indication that it would ever be used as a ‘spy base.’56    
Nord Stream allows for Russian gas to be exported to Western Europe even in the event 
that Russia halts exports to Eastern European states.  Having an underwater route eliminates the 
interference of transit countries and allows Russia to exert pressure on region like Eastern 
Europe, while still ensuring supplies and maintaining good relations with the valued customers in 
Western Europe.  Before Nord Stream, any disruption to supplies going through transit states 
would impact Western Europe, which is not usually the target of Russia’s pipeline politics.  In a 
2009 interview with the New York Times, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, former head of the Polish 
security service, responded that “the ability to shut off one pipeline or the other ‘depending on a 
whim’ makes shutoffs to Eastern Europe more likely,” indicating that the Nord Stream pipeline 
may increase the vulnerability to Eastern European countries who will be bypassed by Nord 
Stream, as well as the South Stream line then in concept.57 Although Gazprom executive, 
Matthias Warnig attempted to dispel these fears, after conducting extensive interviews, NY 
                                                
54 Poussenkova, “Russia’s Energy Giants,” 115-6. 
55 Poussenkova, “Russia’s Energy Giants,” 116. 
56 Robert L. Larsson, “What Does The Nord Stream Mean To The Baltic Sea Region?,” 
Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 01 (2006): 16. 
57 Andrew E. Kramer, “Continental Divide: Russia Gas Pipeline Heightens East Europe’s 
Fears,”New York Times, October 12, 2009, accessed October 1, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/13/world/europe/13pipes.html?em&_r=0.  
 
16 
 
 
Times journalist Andrew Kramer noted that the overwhelming sentiment in Eastern Europe was 
that “the pipeline issue evokes deep memories of a darker era of occupation and collaboration, 
and has become a proxy debate over Russia’s intentions toward the lands it ruled from the end of 
World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall.”58  He notes that Radek Sikorski, Polish foreign 
minister, views this Russian-German negotiation as reminiscent of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
that divvied up Eastern Europe.  These types of bilateral agreements are the modus operandi of 
Gazprom, but from an EU perspective, there seems to be a need for more convergence on energy 
policy, especially concerning large-scale projects like Nord Stream.59 
Despite the controversy, the EU granted Nord Stream status as a Trans-European Network-
Energy project (TEN-E).  TEN-E is an EU program that is used to fund energy projects that are 
beneficial to improving interdependence of European energy markets.60 Robert L. Larsson, 
security analyst for the Swedish Defence Research Institute, comments that although this status 
adds legitimacy and funding to the project, “[i]n reality, the TEN-E status is not as important as 
it may seem […]61  From Gazprom’s perspective, the goal of the Nord Stream project is to 
develop a pipeline “that will make it possible both to diversify Russian gas export routes and 
to ensure utmost reliability in gas supplies to European consumers.”62  Furthermore, the 
European Parliament published a briefing paper conducted by Larsson, “Security Implications of 
the Nord Stream Project” in February 2008, which states: 
Since Russia has strong ambitions of again becoming a great power and uses all 
available means in its endeavors, it is pivotal that the EU and its members assess 
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the Nord Stream project in this light and act accordingly. An assessment of the 
project cannot be based on a best-case scenario.63 
 
The paper continues the discussion of the security ramifications for the traditional transit states, 
such as, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.  This pipeline increases the potential that Baltic 
States could become more vulnerable to their neighbor, Russia.64   Russia has often been accused 
of using its dominance as an energy supplier to influence policies and politics in Europe; 
therefore this tactic must not be overlooked.  The EU’s response to Nord Stream, though, is 
remarkably contradictory.   
Gazprom promotes itself as a company that is actually assisting Europe in achieving its 
energy goals.   The official Gazprom statements imply that projects such as Nord Stream are 
beneficial to EU energy security: 
In this regard, back in December 2000 the European Commission had assigned 
the Nord Stream project the Trans-European Network (TEN) status, which was 
confirmed once again in 2006. This means Nord Stream is a key project aimed 
at creating crucial cross-border transport capacities with a view to ensure 
sustainability and energy security in Europe.65 
 
It seems ironic that Nord Stream is hailed as championing “cross-border transport”, when, in 
essence, the entire practical effect of this project is to achieve the direct opposite.  Nord Stream 
was constructed in order to circumvent borders, instead of crossing through them.  The key 
borders that have been bypassed are those of EU Member States, such has Poland, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. Gazprom goes on to state, more specifically, that by avoiding transit 
countries, “this reduces Russian gas transmission costs and eliminates any possible political 
risks. Nord Stream will provide customers in Western Europe with the most reliable gas 
                                                
63 Larsson, “Security Implications of the Nord Stream Project,” iii. 
64 Larsson, “Security Implications of the Nord Stream Project,” iii. 
65 “Nord Stream.” 
18 
 
 
deliveries.”66  This emphasizes the dividing line between East and West in the EU and that 
Gazprom aims to provide additional supply routes to preferred customers in Western Europe.  
This could mean an increase in vulnerability to pipeline politics for Eastern European customers. 
The main argument in support of the Nord Stream Pipeline is that it will offer a new route for gas 
imports, thereby diversifying the supply routes to the EU. A secondary effect will be the benefits 
of infrastructure development and improvement that will accompany the implementation of such 
a large-scale project.67   By routing the pipeline through the Baltic Sea, as opposed to a 
traditional land pipeline, Gazprom is able to eliminate the transit costs and risks, such as illegal 
siphoning, through those countries.68   
Although there appear to be noticeable contradictions when it comes to the EU and Nord 
Stream, an assembly of delegates from Eastern European nations made their assessment of Nord 
Stream very clear.   In an appeal to President Obama, the former presidents and prime ministers 
of several Baltic and Eastern European nations, among them Lech Walęsa (former President of 
Poland and leader of the Solidarity Movement), Valdas Adamkus (former Present of Lithuania), 
Vaira Vike-Freiberga (former President of Latvia), and Mart Laar (former Prime Minister of 
Estonia) along with eighteen other presidents and ministers representing Eastern European 
nations, wrote a letter which was published July 15, 2009, in the Polish newspaper Gazeta 
Wyborcza.  Drawing on the tradition of the United States’ support of democracy in Eastern 
Europe, especially during and after the Cold War, they hope to appeal once again for support as 
they face a threat from their Eastern neighbor once again. They express the fear that major 
powers of the world, such as the United States, Russia, and only select nations in the European 
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Union, may leave the smaller nations Eastern Europe vulnerable. This excerpt illustrates their 
sentiment toward Russia and the vulnerabilities of energy dependence: 
Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would 
finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining 
NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist 
power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a 
global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a 
regional level and vis-à-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It 
challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged 
position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of 
economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated 
investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests 
and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe […] 
Central and Eastern European countries should lobby harder (and with more 
unity) inside Europe for diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit 
routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse of its monopoly and 
cartel-like power inside the EU.69 
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CHAPTER 4 
GAZPROM, GAS CRISES, AND DIPLOMACY 
The EU has been investigating Gazprom for violating anti-trust laws within the European 
Union since September 2011.  Gazprom’s business practices in the Baltic States, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, as well as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, are 
under particular scrutiny because of Gazprom’s monopoly on supply and supply routes, which 
prevents competition; both violate EU competition law.  These Eastern European countries in 
particular are more susceptible to disruptions in energy supplies because they rely almost 
exclusively on Russian natural gas.  Gazprom’s role as producer, supplier, and owner of the 
pipelines provides a powerful advantage.  To add to this increasingly imbalanced relationship 
between the EU and Russia, on December 4, 2013, the EU Commission approved Gazprom’s 
acquisition of 50% of WINZ Wintershall and 100% control over Wingas and WIEH of Germany.  
The Commission’s rationale for their decision was that “the transaction would not raise 
competition concerns as it would not allow Gazprom to restrict customers’ access to gas 
supplies.”70  In the same document the Commission also acknowledges that “some Member 
States rely on one single supplier and often on one single supply route for 80%-100% of their gas 
consumption […].”71  Furthermore, the Commission projects that by 2035 the EU will import 
over 80% of its gas and oil.72  So while investigating Gazprom for unfair, if not illegal, business 
practices as a monopoly that puts certain Member States at risk, the Commission simultaneously 
facilitates Gazprom’s partial takeover of the German energy sector. These proceedings were also 
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taking place at the same time that protests were erupting in Kiev over Ukrainian President 
Yanukovych’s refusal to sign an agreement with the EU, while Russia was claiming that the EU 
was coercing Ukraine into deepening ties with the EU.73   
Undoubtedly, Germany and Gazprom share a unique partnership that some have viewed 
as more than just strategic for smooth business transactions.  The action of former Chancellor of 
Germany, Gerhard Schroeder, is an example of a calculated maneuver that raised suspicions of 
corruption.  Four weeks before the end of his term, Schroeder pledged that the German banks 
Deutsche Bank and KfW would agree to be guarantors to Gazprom up to one billion Euros; this 
prompted an investigation of this questionable guarantee by the EU Commission.74  Furthermore, 
less than one month after finishing his term as Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder was 
made Chairman of Gazprom’s Shareholders’ Committee for the Nord Stream Project.75  He was 
not the first influential German on the board, but joined the Board Chairman of Dresdner Bank, 
Matthias Warnig, who Poussenkova notes had, “allegedly served with Putin in then East 
Germany,” but became managing director of Nord Stream.76   
The EU investigation of Gazprom could lead to large fines, which could be as much as 
10% of its global annual sales, estimated to be around €12 billion; this would be the highest fine 
the EU has ever imposed on any entity.  The objections to Gazprom’s practices include the 
ownership of the supply and the pipelines that deliver natural gas, forcing customers to enter into 
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long-term gas contracts, and pegging the price of gas to that of oil.77 It seems to be an ambitious 
action to take against Gazprom, considering the EU has not successfully diversified its natural 
gas and still purchases between 25% and 30% from Russia.  EU Energy Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger, though, says in reference to the Commission’s investigation of Gazprom’s unfair 
business practices in Eastern Europe, it shows that “the Commission has the courage to take on 
large corporations when it comes to securing a common market.”78  Gazprom has proven in the 
past that it will suspend gas supply in the event of contracts and pricing it deems unfair, so it has 
the potential to be a problematic decision. 
Supply Routes and the New Map of Europe 
It is not until the EU truly diversifies the suppliers that natural gas will be more secure.  
The lack of a consistent and unified energy policy at the EU level has encouraged individual 
Member States to pursue energy interests as individuals and this has led to further isolation 
rather than deeper integration for EU Member States. A major deficiency of the current layout of 
natural gas pipelines is that they run mostly from East to West, from Russia to Europe with an 
underdeveloped network of connectors among EU Member States.  This means that there is 
access and risk that is distributed unevenly among Member States; one can look at any map and 
interpret this as an uneven distribution between “old” members and “new” members a division 
which Stacy Closson, Trans-Atlantic Post-Doctoral Fellow for International Relations and 
Security, also acknowledges.79 
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This inconsistent response to energy issues exposes the  “knee-jerk national 
protectionism” that EU Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger specifically warned against in 
his April 2013 address to the CMS Competition Conference in Brussels.80 Oettinger includes 
energy subsidies, politically motivated price regulation, and other price fixing as a “nation-
centric way of thinking ‘nation first, community-wide second […] that could tear apart the fabric 
of our legal framework.”81  With this, he asked the EU to recall that the foundation of the union 
was coal and steel, and of all the treaties, competencies, and policies, that energy should be as 
essential now as it was during the birth of the EU.  Its inspiration as a tool of connectivity 
leading to lasting peace in Europe should not be forgotten or understated. 
The European Parliament has published (a study?) that states that even though the Nord 
Stream Pipeline offers a new route for gas supplies to Germany, it certainly negatively impacts 
numerous EU Member States, and therefore “hampers development of a common energy 
strategy as it divides the EU and the region into two parts, those that benefit and those that do 
not.”82  Nord Stream caused a power shift between the Baltic States and Russia, which 
contributed to the revival of nuclear programs and fracking in the Baltic region, both of which 
are highly debated energy topics in the EU.83  The Baltics lost the certainty of knowing without a 
doubt they were more secure being a part of the EU because other Member States directly 
increased the Baltic’s vulnerability to Russian energy politics. 
If any single Member State is threatened, it should be addressed at the EU level, but the 
pipeline politics of Nord Stream divide the EU.84  Stefan Bouzarovski, energy vulnerability 
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researcher, expresses the opinion that there is the concern that Nord Stream might “draw a new 
border across Europe”, diving those who have favorable relations with Russia and uninterrupted 
supplies and those Member States that have less amicable relations and are at risk for interrupted 
energy supplies.85  By diversifying the gas routes to Western Europe via Nord Stream, Eastern 
European gas security decreased as a direct result.86   
Aside from the security concerns, it is questionable whether Nord Stream made sense 
financially.  The cost of building a natural gas pipeline under the Baltic sea, around €8 billion, is 
much higher than if additional capacity were to be added on to the existing infrastructures, which 
was estimated at €2.5 billion.87 Due to the polarizing and divisive impact of Nord Stream, it 
should not have been given TEN-E status and EU funding.    
EU Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger stated in April, 2013:  
There is a threat looming over Europe.  It does not come from China, India, the 
US or any other force.  The main threat to the completion of the internal energy 
market, to our foundation to peace and stability, is a nation-centric way of 
thinking ‘nation first, community-wide second.’88 
 
Commissioner Oettinger has highlighted the greatest challenge to EU energy security, and that is 
that there exists no unified policy, but rather a series of contradictions and paradoxes.  This is 
obvious in the natural gas projects that have been developing, or stalled through the Southern 
Corridor to Austria. 
 The EU Commission outlined major energy policy objectives in “Energy 2020,” 
including “a specific emphasis on the Southern corridor and the effective start of projects of 
European interest, in particular Nabucco and ITGI;” These were competitors to Gazprom’s 
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proposed South Stream Pipeline.89  The Southern Corridor refers to pipeline routes that would 
supply the EU by entering through Southern Europe and connecting to Central Asian and/or 
Caspian gas reserves, and for the EU this presents the opportunity to secure a new, non-Russian 
supplier.  The Commission reiterates throughout the communication that diversified imports are 
essential and that this infrastructure will be partially financed by tariffs, that is by consumers, but 
also the Commission intends to take actions to encourage investments.   
Financial support is not the only type of backing these projects will need. A theme to the 
entire communication is that there must be a commitment to “energy solidarity” among Member 
States.  This means that Member States should not think of themselves and their energy policy as 
an ‘island’ and that the impacts of energy policy on other Member States must be taken into 
consideration.  Further more, it states that, “energy policy is also responsible for protecting 
European citizens from the risks of energy production and transport.”90  This is an interesting 
comment because it indicates that the EU policy should generally benefit the protection of all 
European citizens, not strictly EU citizens.  This becomes especially important with gas 
transport, as there are several key transit countries that are not EU Members, such as Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Serbia.   
Russia’s Geopolitical Instrument: Hydrocarbon Resources 
Although there are conflicting accounts of the precise causes of energy disruptions between 
Russia and the EU, there are some that could indicate Russia’s unfair use of hydrocarbon 
resources as a political tool.  Since the 1990’s Russia has repeatedly been accused of using 
energy resources as a political tool.  Beginning with its neighboring Baltic countries, Russia has 
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created numerous disruptions in supply that appear to have been politically motivated.  Lithuania 
seems to have been a target between 1998 and 2000 during the negotiations and sale of the 
Mażeikiu Nafta oil refinery.  Oil supplies were stopped nine times during these negotiations.  
Russia’s Rosneft was among the potential buyers, but not favored, while Lithuania prepared to 
diversify the energy mix in order to avoid over dependence on Russian hydrocarbons.91   
 In 2004 the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which prompted several other ‘Color 
Revolutions,’ marked another period of strained relations between Russian and Eastern Europe.  
Poland was also experiencing difficulty in finally obtaining full disclosure of the Katyn 
Massacre, where thousands of Polish officers were rounded up, shot, and buried in a mass grave 
during World War II.92  This also occurred at the same time as Germany and Russia solidified 
plans and prepared to construct the Nord Stream Pipeline.   Estonia, as mentioned previously, 
had also experienced a strained relationship with Russia.  In 2007 Estonia experienced stoppages 
that occurred immediately after the relocation of the Bronze Soldier statue, erected by the Red 
Army in Tallinn.93  For the Russian population in Estonia and in Russia, it was a symbol of 
victory over the Nazis and Fascism, but the overwhelming majority of ethnic Estonians regarded 
it as a reminder of Soviet occupation. The move led to protests in Tallinn and Moscow that 
escalated to riots called “Bronze Nights”, 94  and subsequently there were unexpected 
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‘disruptions’ in Russian energy supplies. The official response from Gazprom was that the 
infrastructure required repairs.95 
 Belarus and Ukraine, key transit states to the EU, have continued to have difficulties with 
Russian energy.  January 1, 2004, Gazprom gas to Belarus stopped after Belarus failed to give in 
to Gazprom’s coercive negotiations.  In 2007 Belarus experienced the major disruptions through 
the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) during the ‘Moscow-Minsk’ oil conflict.  The result was the 
construction of BPS-2, the Russian solution to a so-called unreliable transit state.96  Though like 
most of the former Soviet states, Belarus enjoyed subsidized energy, the prices have steadily 
risen, leading to serious debt.  An underlying factor to these troubles is that in Russia and the 
Soviet Union, household gas was not metered, rather consumers were charged a flat rate, making 
the transition to collecting payments for gas used nearly impossible.  Stacy Closson, who has 
served as an expert on policy issues in Ukraine and the Caucasus under the United States 
Department of Defense, highlights this part of the problem: 
These countries had grown accustomed to low prices and a barter system 
employed during the Soviet era, and factories were built with little consideration 
for energy efficiency and conservation.  Neither the Siberian gas field, where the 
gas originated, nor homes throughout the Soviet Union were metered.  The newly 
independent governments experience difficulties in convincing their citizenry to 
pay for the energy they consumed.97 
 
But this may not last much longer, as Russia has also identified this pitfall and set a goal in 
“Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2030” to gradually increase and liberalize domestic gas prices in a 
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manner that assures responsible usage.  It does not stop there, but goes on further to promote 
energy savings through higher efficiency and regular audits to increase accountability.98   
The Deteriorating Relationship Between Russia and Ukraine 
Of all the Eastern European nations, though, Ukraine has a very complicated relationship 
with Russia.  Disputes between Russia and Ukraine led to dramatic supply disruptions in 2006 
and again in 2009.  The 2006 episode came to a boiling point on January 1, 2006, when Gazprom 
halted all supplies destined for Ukraine’s state-operated gas company, Naftogaz Ukrainy, for 
unresolved disputes. Gazprom accused Naftogaz of diverting supplies intended for the EU for its 
own domestic use in Ukraine.  After a series of talks an agreement was reached and supply 
resumed a few days later.99  There was widespread speculation that the interruption was used to 
exert pressure on the more Western-oriented government of President Viktor Yushchenko 
following the Orange Revolution.100  A similar situation arose in the beginning of January 2009, 
when again, Russia accused Ukraine of siphoning and diverting gas. This dispute was far more 
serious and impacted supply to over a dozen European countries until January 18, 2009.101  
Russia tried to paint Ukraine as an unreliable transit state, but it is increasingly difficult to ignore 
the common denominator in these energy disputes.  Scholars such as Jeronim Perovic also notice 
this trend of increasingly aggressive diplomacy, “Russia’s rise as an energy power has stirred up 
a level of controversy that has not been seen since the days of the Cold War.”102 Robert Orttung 
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shares a similar viewpoint that, “Increased income from the energy sector has helped to bolster 
an authoritarian government […] Russia has built a state with extensive coercive capacity.”103  
Paillard poses that in Russia “raw political power determines energy policy.”104  Stefan 
Bouzarovski and Marcin Konieczny make a slightly different evaluation of pipelines such as 
Nord Stream stating that the “potential, rather than actual material existence that has led to 
dramatic changes in national security discourses.”105 
 It is important to note that Ukraine benefited from, but also became dependant upon, 
subsidized Russian gas.  This is a peril of subsidized energy imports.  The addiction to cheap gas 
makes Ukraine’s foreign policy and energy policy susceptible to Russian coercion.  Gazprom 
makes about 70% of its total profits from the gas that it sells to the Western European markets, 
where Gazprom can charge a much higher price.106 In a 2009 press statement by Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the EU Commissioner for External Affairs from 2004 to 2009: “The EU may depend 
on Russia for 25% of our gas and oil supplies, but 70% of Gazprom's revenue comes from us.”107  
This supports the argument that Russia needs the European markets as badly as Europe needs 
Russian gas.   
In the past, there has been tension with some Gazprom customers who objected to or 
experienced difficulties in fulfilling inflexible, long-term contracts. Gazprom’s contracts are 
oftentimes multi-decade long agreements.  The true cost of an addiction to subsidized energy can 
manifest itself in other ways, such as in Ukraine.  In 2010, Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych signed an agreement with Russia for a 25-year extension on the lease of the Black 
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Sea port Sevastopol for Russia’s Navy in exchange for a $45 billion dollar subsidy in gas prices 
over the subsequent decade.  This was not received well by all members in Parliament, though 
the vote showed that a majority of representatives supported the decision.  The outrage from 
those who were not in favor led to chaos during a parliamentary session, where fistfights broke 
out, smoke bombs were set off, and the Speaker, Volodymyr Lytvyn, even had to dodge a 
barrage of eggs thrown at him.108  This highlights how closely natural gas and national security 
can be bound.  With rising debts and economic problems, Ukraine elected to compromise 
sovereignty for a subsidy. 
Energy 2020 expresses a pan-European solidarity in energy, but at the same time, EU has 
been willing to support pipeline projects like Nabucco or South Stream in the southern corridor, 
which could have directly increased Ukraine’s vulnerability.  Although the gas would have been 
from Azerbaijan, the pipelines are owned and controlled by Russia.  If Russia were inclined to 
use energy as an instrument of influence on Ukraine, it would have the ability to do so, while still 
supplying its most valued customers in Western Europe.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 NABUCCO AND SOUTH STREAM ‘PIPE-DREAMS’ 
The Nabucco Project was an EU solution for increasing natural gas transit routes as well 
as suppliers.  In the end, though, it turned out to be another ‘pipe-dream.’  The goal was to 
connect Central Asia to Central Europe.  Nabucco was backed by the following companies: BEH 
(Bulgaria), BOTAS (Turkey), FGSZ (Hungary), GDF SUEZ (France), OMV (Austria), and 
Transgaz (Romania); and in May 2013 GDF Suez (France) purchased 9% of OMV’s shares and 
joined the “pan-European” gas project.109  The project was proposed in 2002 and was planned to 
be a 3300km long pipeline that at full capacity could transport 31 bcm of natural gas per year. 
The route was first planned to access gas from Turkmenistan, but this option was taken off the 
table after Gazprom signed a contract guaranteeing access to Turkmen gas until 2020; the next 
step was to link Nabucco to the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline and transport Azeri gas to Europe 
with the end destination in Baumgarten, Austria, at the Central European Gas Hub.  The goal 
was to decrease dependency on Russian gas imports by securing supplies from Central Asia.110  
Unfortunately, this was not fully realized.  Gazprom was already the dominant supplier of natural 
gas to Austria; Austria imports 60% of its gas from Russia.111  The EU Commissioner, Andris 
Piebalgs, stated in his letter to the Commission regarding the exemption of Nabucco from parts 
of the Gas Directive regulations, such as exempting it from regulated third party access as long 
as certain criteria were met,  for instance maintaining stable tariffs pegged to the EU average 
plus or minus ten percent,  
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The Commission therefore considers it necessary to pay particular attention to the 
worst-case scenarios as developed in the exemption decision, i.e. a dominant 
market player becoming the capacity holder of all or of large part of the gas from 
the Nabucco pipeline exiting in Austria. In such a worst-case scenario, Nabucco 
could not be considered to enhance competition.112 
 
The letter goes on to explain that it is quite possible that Austrian energy company OMV’s 
existing relationship with Gazprom may have domino effect on increased cooperation by other 
Member States. The concern is that the Gazprom energy giant may become so deeply entwined 
in essential EU energy projects that it would compromise the political and diplomatic responses 
by the EU in the event of a conflict.  This is exacerbated by the fact the pipelines from Russia are 
a major source of supply and emergency reserves of liquid natural gas (LNG) are limited.  Still, 
though, Commission still felt confident enough to claim, “Nabucco pipeline is considered to 
enhance the security of gas supply for the Austria and the EU as a whole.” 113 
 The Nabucco Austrian company, OMV Gas and Power GmbH, and German company, 
RWE Supply and Trading Company, additionally created the Caspian Energy Company (CEC) 
in 2008 with the aim of developing gas pipelines across the Caspian Sea to supply the South 
Caucasus Pipeline and the future Nabucco Pipeline.114  This project was a rival of Gazprom’s 
South Stream Pipeline, and unfortunately, lost bids to Russian interests time after time.  June 26, 
2013 the Shah Deniz II consortium informed Nabucco shareholders that their pipeline did not 
win the bid for access to their Azeri gas reserves.115 This can be attributed to at least two main 
factors. 
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First, OMV undermined the Nabucco Pipeline by signing agreements and supporting the 
number one competitor, Gazprom’s South Stream Pipeline.  The official agreement on the 
Austrian section of South Stream was signed April 24, 2010.  This document was not only 
between the two companies, but was also signed by Austrian Federal Minister Reinhold 
Mitterlehner and the Energy Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Shamtko. This pipeline, 
like Nabucco, would send supplies OMV’s Central European Gas Hub, which is one of OMV’s 
most profitable enterprises located in Baumgarten, Austria, and projected to start operations by 
the end of 2015.116  Currently the CEGH handles gas auctions, trading, and titles and transfer 
paperwork as a major online marketplace.117 
Secondly, there was a serious flaw with suppliers in the plan. Other possible suppliers 
included Mashreq countries, but it was unlikely that Egypt, Qatar, or Iran would agree to sell 
sufficient amounts; Iraq theoretically may have had potential if their Kurdish reserves were 
adequate.118  The lack of any binding, official agreement for a supplier was a major flaw and 
subsequently fatal flaw in this project, to say the least.  
The South Stream pipeline is another astronomically expensive pipeline, a route planned 
through the Black Sea so as to bypass Ukraine.  While Gazprom is the majority shareholder, 
Italy’s ENI and France’s EDF are also involved.  It was Gazprom’s southern counterpart to the 
Nord Stream pipeline, which connects gas reserves in Russia to Greifswald, Germany, via the 
Baltic Sea. Again, Gazprom succeeded in partnering with some of the most influential countries 
in the EU that seem to act without regard to the spirit of solidarity that policies should have.  
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South Stream has been referred to as “a free solution to transit dependence with regard to 
Ukraine.”119  Around 80% of Russian gas is transported to Europe via Ukraine.120  This amount 
is around one third of Gazprom’s supply, but this one third generates 60% of Gazprom’s annual 
revenue due to the prices charged to Europe versus the highly subsidized domestic sales.121 The 
construction is already underway, but there are still uncertainties about its operation in the EU 
because EU competition law forbids the supplier to own the transit infrastructure as well.  
December 4, 2013, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, director of the Internal Energy Market in the 
European Commission provided that “in all openness and frankness, the South Stream link will 
not operate in the territory of the European union if it’s not in compliance with EU law.”122 
Gazprom’s investigation by the EU Commission for violating trade practices for natural gas, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe, does not seem to prevent new project and contracts 
from being signed. 
 South Stream is not the only route that puts Ukraine’s energy security at risk.  The other 
Gazprom routes that strategically avoid Ukraine include Blue Stream, which starts in Russia, 
crosses the Black Sea, and supplies Turkey with Russian natural gas.  The Yamal-Europe 
pipeline, also known as Northern Light, originates in Russia and travels through Belarus to the 
EU.123 
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South Stream construction was already underway when in December 2014, President 
Putin suddenly dropped the project.124  This has stunned the international audience.  Although 
the gas crises in Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 were felt in the EU, there has still been no substantial 
change to the EU Energy Policy.  It was clear that there is a risk associated with the primary 
supplier of EU natural gas.  The Commission exhausts itself in writing memoranda and 
communications, but lack of enforcement continues. 125 
Central European Gas Hub 
The Central European Gas Hub (CEGH) is the pride of Austrian energy company, OMV.  
It is a large storage node in Baumgarten, and is both a supplier and transporter of natural gas.  It 
supplies not only Austrian natural gas consumers, but also transports upwards of 75 bcm gas to 
Germany, Italy, France, Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary each year.126  The CEGH was originally 
a 100% Austrian OMV enterprise, but in 2008, OMV states that it sold 30% to Gazprom and 
20% to both Wiener Börse AG and Centrex Europe Energy & Gas AG. 127 
Despite Austria’s preferential relationship with Russia’s Gazprom, this did not prevent 
Austrians from feeling the effects of the January 2009 Ukrainian gas crisis, which resulted from 
disagreements between Ukraine and Russia regarding contracts, prices, and allegations of illegal 
gas siphoning and diversion.  The supply to Austria dropped to a mere 10% by January 6, and 
stopped completely January 7. Fortunately for their customers, OMV subsidiary reserves were 
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able to guarantee a normal level of supply through the crisis.128 Nina Poussenkova claims that 
“The gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine were the most widely publicized energy conflicts 
of the decade because European countries became victims of their economic, energy, and 
political disagreements.”129 
The CEHG had been planning to receive a significant portion of its gas supply through 
the Nabucco pipeline, which was to have increased energy security for Europe by decreasing 
Russian imports and also bypassing Ukraine.  From Baumgarten CEGH, a series of 
interconnectors would form a network of supply within Europe, thereby integrating the internal 
EU gas market.130   Werner Auli, Member of OMV’s Executive Board responsible for Gas & 
Power, stated: 
The planned South Stream and Nabucco gas pipelines will further increase the 
significance of OMV’s Baumgarten distribution node as a key European natural 
gas turntable and boost the security of Europe’s supply. As for the Central 
European Gas Hub, already one of the most important gas trading platforms in 
continental Europe, this additional liquidity at its main trading point will also 
provide strong momentum and clear support as it seeks to become the leading gas 
hub in continental Europe.131 
 
Although the CEGH had been an OMV project, in 2009 the shareholder structure shows that 
OMV has 65%, Wiener Börse AG 20%, and Slovak Eustream 15%.132, the OAO Gazprom 
Annual Management Report for 2008 further suggests that “in January 2008 the Gazprom Group 
signed an agreement with Austrian company OMV AG under which the Gazprom Group will 
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obtain 50% interest in Central Europe Gas Hub (Baumgarten), one of the largest gas distribution 
centers in Europe.”133   
 This 2008 Gazprom Management Report goes on to define Gazprom’s key objectives in 
the European market to include “expanding the use of underground gas storage facilities in 
Europe and increase its ownership in companies engaged in the sale of gas and electricity to end-
users.”134  Gazprom has been able to set goals and also achieve them, such as buying its way into 
the infrastructure that the EU has developed to avoid depending on Russian energy.  The EU 
exhausts itself with publications of energy security, solidarity, and diversification, but has been 
crippled by its lack of any enforcement mechanisms to keep energy companies within the EU 
from compromising the unified vision for energy security in Europe.   
 During that same month, January 2008, Italian ENI and Gazprom signed an agreement to 
establish South Stream Company and Gazprom also signed agreements with Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary and Greece, allowing Gazprom to construct the land routes for South Stream through 
their countries; and there were still ongoing negotiations with Austria.135  Gazprom has an 
organized strategy and clear vision of how to maintain its position as primary natural gas 
supplier to the EU.  The EU, on the other hand, shows how vulnerable it has become due to its 
lack of enforcement of the unified policies it promotes. 
 The fact that Austria provided the opportunity for Gazprom to take control of 50% of the 
CEGH in 2008 almost doomed the EU’s Nabucco pipeline from the start.  Nabucco was to be the 
key pipeline to supply the CEGH with Central Asian gas, thereby diversifying both the route and 
supplier to Europe.  Time and time again the EU promoted diversification and lessening the 
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dependence on Russian gas, but consistently fell short of expectations.  More importantly 
though, OMV’s and Austria’s actions undermined the security of the CEGH by allowing so 
much control to go to the single natural gas supplier from which the EU had hoped to lessen its 
dependence.   
 Gazprom would never have openly supported the Nabucco Pipeline to the CEGH for a 
number of reasons.  First, it would compromise Gazprom’s position as the primary natural gas 
supplier to Europe.  Second, it would lessen Russia’s influence in Central Asia by providing 
Azerbaijan with the attractive, high-paying customers of the EU.  Gazprom had enjoyed a 
privileged partnership with Central Asian gas reserves, which it has no intention of giving up.   
 Considering all of these factors, Gazprom has certainly managed to mitigate any threats 
by promoting its own project, South Stream.  Gazprom was able to partner with companies from 
Italy, France, and Austria to guarantee the success of South Stream, but the EU utterly failed to 
garner enough support for the Nabucco project.  This is also while the EU Commission was 
investigating Gazprom for violating EU anti-trust laws, an investigation that still continues.  It is 
incomprehensible how the EU has not taken a bolder stance against the energy companies within 
the EU that have facilitated Gazprom’s success through bilateral agreements at the expense of 
EU Energy security as a whole.  Now, the EU is cradled by Russian gas pipelines, Nord Stream, 
which compromised the energy security of the Baltic Member States for the gains of German, 
French, and Dutch energy companies, and South Stream that bypasses Ukraine, and Yamal-
Europe, going directly to the heart of the EU.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP, POLAND’S PUSH FOR SOLIDARITY, AND THE  
FUTURE OF RUSSIAN-EU ENERGY RELATIONS 
The EU initiated the Eastern Partnership Program in 2009 in Prague.  This program 
includes Eastern European countries that are not Member States, including Ukraine, Moldova, 
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The partnership aims to strengthen democracy and foster a 
closer political, economic, and cultural relationship with the EU.  More specific goals include: 
“new, deeper contractual relations between the EU and partner countries; supporting the mobility 
of citizens and visa liberalization in a well managed and secure environment; and enhance sector 
cooperation in EU programmes and agencies.”136 
 One of the fundamental elements of the Eastern Partnership is energy security.  The 
program aims to promote, “steps to integrate Eastern European countries and EU energy 
markets, enhance network interconnections between the EU and the Eastern partnership 
countries, diversify supply sources and routes, improve energy efficiency and the use of 
renewables.”137  Furthermore, the program intends to take “concrete steps towards the realization 
of the Southern Gas Corridor, a strategically important infrastructure to ensure the diversification 
of energy supply routes from the Caspian Sea to the European market.”138 Although, the program 
has admirable goals of fighting corruption, human trafficking, and increasing progress towards 
modernization, it seems contradictory for the EU to attempt to strengthen an energy relationship 
with Ukraine without having included Ukraine on the Nabucco pipeline project and while EU 
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Member State energy companies were funding South Stream, since both of these projects 
directly increased the vulnerability of Ukraine to Russian gas politics.  After, watching the EU’s 
flagship pipeline, Nabucco, fail as Gazprom’s South Stream out-bid it, the amount of faith that 
the Eastern Partners can put in the EU’s ability to follow through on energy policy has 
decreased.  Though the EU suggests that their Eastern Partners pursue energy projects of 
“common strategic importance in oil, gas, and electricity” and focusing on supply security and 
the impact of these projects on Eastern Europe, it seems that the EU itself does not seem hold 
actual member states to the same standard.139  Russia has shown how ambitious and dedicated it 
is to Gazprom’s projects to ensure a monopoly on EU markets.   
The Eastern Partnership had put forth an expectation that by Autumn of 2013 there would 
have been progress toward its four objectives in energy: “enhancement of framework conditions 
and solidarity; support for infrastructure development, interconnection and diversification of 
supply; promotion of increased energy efficiency and use of renewable resources; regulatory 
framework and approximation of energy polices.”140  The EU states its intention of monitoring 
the progress in the Eastern Partnership countries, but it seems that there is a lack of self-
evaluation at the same level.  Before the EU asks other non-EU to join in coordinating energy 
solidarity efforts, it desperately needs to reexamine solidarity internally.   
Dominique Finon, Senior Research Fellow in Economics of the French National Center 
of Scientific Research (CNRS), illustrates the nature of the EU in regards to the failed Nabucco 
Pipeline and lack of energy solidarity in an article, “The EU Foreign Gas Policy of Transit 
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Corridors: Autopsy of the Stillborn Nabucco Project.”  He describes the EU as “trying to be a de 
facto superstate with the traditional attributes of power, despite the fact that it lacks the means to 
enforce its own sovereignty,” and that this often leads to a use of ‘soft power’ to influence 
foreign affairs.141  Russia has also been accused of using ‘soft power’, often with hydrocarbon 
resources as the tool, but she explains that the difference is that they also have the capability to 
employ force because they have a military and defense systems in place.  He implies that there 
are member states, notably Germany, France, and Italy, who have pursued national energy 
interests that may or may not be convergent with the EU energy policy, which ultimately shows 
a lack of confidence in the EU’s ability to secure energy interests.142 
 With this in mind, it will be one of the EU’s greatest challenges to achieve true energy 
solidarity and security while even the two founding members, Germany and France, who should 
be the paradigm, have pursued energy interests that are divergent from the EU’s energy policy.  
If individual nations continue to undermine the EU energy policy and security, the EU will 
continue to be at risk of over-dependence on Russian gas.  
Natural gas is a major part of the European energy mix, especially because it is cleaner 
than coal and can help European Union Member States to achieve their emissions standards.  
Unfortunately, the EU does not have sufficient natural gas reserves and is reliant upon imports. 
In an effort to diversify risk, the EU has supported several gas pipeline projects, such as Nord 
Stream, but several EU Member States have opposed this pipeline since its inception, with 
Poland as one of the most active entities, despite being a “new member.”  
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Poland’s Impact on EU Energy Policy 
Poland, which entered the EU in 2004, has used controversial projects like the Nord 
Stream Pipeline to take a stance and improve upon some of the EU’s energy policies.  The 
concept of Nord Stream was developed in 2005, so due to the timing and the geographic 
location, it became a topic the Poland was able to use to find its voice in the EU policy-making 
sphere. Poland’s actions were important not only for its own energy security, but also for smaller 
countries such as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia that depend more heavily on Russian 
hydrocarbons.   
Ernest Wyciszkiewicz, senior research fellow and coordinator of the Program on 
International Economy and Energy Security at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, 
recognizes that despite the oil crises in the 1970’s, the rise of resource nationalism in the 1980’s, 
it was not until the new EU Member States from Eastern Europe joined the EU in 2004 that the 
concept of ‘energy solidarity’ was revitalized.143  He attributes this partly due to the fact that 
“these eight new Member States from the Central Europe and Baltic region were highly or totally 
dependent on a single supplier of oil and gas, with whom they shared quite difficult history of 
political and economic relations.”144 
 Polish concern for energy security stems from the fact that it lacks diversity in gas and oil 
imports; most are purchased from Gazprom.  This contributes to Poland’s stance in pushing for a 
fair and effective energy policy at the EU level.  Wyciszkiewicz notes that Poland was not alone 
in recognizing the influence that Russia had exerted by means of Gazprom.145 Then in 2005 the 
solidification of the Nord Stream Project between Russia and Germany captured Poland’s 
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attention and, in response, Poland has become one of the most active Member States when it 
comes to addressing EU level energy policy. 146 
 Poland brought the concept of ‘energy solidarity’ onto the EU’s radar, reminding the 
Commission that true solidarity would mean that disruptions or other threats to any EU member 
should be addressed as important to the entire EU as a whole.  Wyciszkiewisz points out that 
Poland championed a small line in the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council of June 
2006, where what is proposed is: “full support to infrastructure projects aimed at opening up new 
supply routes with a view of diversifying energy imports of sources which would benefit all 
Member States.” 147  Poland’s use of solidarity as guidance for all EU energy policy did meet 
some resistance, principally from Germany when Poland pushed to include a “solidarity clause” 
in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.148  The clause reads as follows:  
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a 
Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, 
including the military resources made available by the Member States.149 
 
In a 2012 project commissioned by the European Commission to evaluate the Baltic Energy 
Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), the report indicates one of the main objectives to lessen 
dependence on Russian gas will be to “define and strengthen the role of Poland as an ‘energy 
bridge’ to the other countries […].”150  Not only is Poland the link between the isolated Baltic 
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States, but also will increase its role as an energy producer after new shale gas resources are 
projected to supply up to 15 Bcm per year.151 In 2010, the total combined Baltic Market Demand 
from Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia was a mere 5.5 Bcm, compared to the total EU market that 
used 566 Bcm that same year.152  Ironically, the Russian Federation’s “Energy Strategy to 2030” 
uses the same language, also calling the Russian pipeline infrastructure the “energy bridge” 
(энергомост).153 
 The EU Commission’s Second Strategic Energy Review: Energy Security and Solidarity 
stated that “while each Member State is responsible for its own security, solidarity between 
Member States is a basic feature of EU membership […] the combined weight of the EU in 
world affairs can be more effective than dispersed national actions.  For these reasons, energy 
security is an issue of common EU concern.”154  Despite this sentiment, and it can only be called 
a sentiment due to the inconsistencies of the publications and actions, individual Member States 
continue to pursue energy initiatives that negatively impact other Member States.   
 The Commission recognizes the need for funding and investments in the energy sector 
and has made some progress.  In 2013, aid for gas infrastructure projects in Greece and Poland, 
as well as funding toward liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in Greece and Lithuania, were 
approved.155  The Rembelszczyzna-Gustorzyn Pipeline project will modernize some existing 
infrastructure, as well as connect the primary gas hubs in central Poland including reverse flow 
capabilities.  This will allow Operator Gazociągów Przesyłowych Gaz System S.A., the company 
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that will own this infrastucture, to redirect gas not only within Poland, but also through pipelines 
that connect to other Member States.  It will also connect with the Świnoujście LNG terminal 
and the Poland-Lithuania Pipeline, which promotes greater energy security as it is a LNG storage 
site easily accessible to Baltic Member States.156 One of the requirements for this EU state aid is 
that the project must be “recognized by the EU as being in the common interest of the EU 
Member States.”157 The project will also contribute to the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection 
Plan (BEMIP), a series of EU projects aimed to improve energy security and access in Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia.  The Member States involved in these projects include Denmark, Germany, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland and Sweden, all countries that border the Baltic 
Sea.158 After the memorandum was signed by all eight nations in June 2009, Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs commented: 
Ending the effective isolation of the Baltic States, which still form an energy 
island, is an urgent task to deal with. Looking at the actions and projects the plan 
contains and which the countries of the region now endorse, I am now confident 
that this objective can be achieved in a mid-term perspective.159 
 
Russia’s Return to Authoritative State, Revived Nationalism, and Expansion in the Near 
Abroad 
Under President Putin, Russia has returned to a more authoritative state and a revival of 
nationalism.  At the same time President Putin is pursuing an expansionist policy in the near 
abroad.  Exposing the correlation between the increase in energy prices and the decrease of 
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democracy in Russia under Vladimir Putin, Orttung argues that this is not an entirely new 
phenomena, rather it has only reinforced a pre-existing tendency.  Since Putin’s first presidency, 
he has chosen to limit authority to a circle of ‘elites’; he has increased pressure on sources of 
opposition, such as successful entrepreneurs, businesses, and non-governmental organizations; 
and overly influenced the press and other media.160  Orttung further warns, “The suppression of a 
free media and a viable opposition makes it hard for new ideas to emerge, which in turn, stymies 
necessary structural changes.”161  Even Russia’s first private national television network, NTV, 
fell victim to Putin’s acquisitions, as a result of owner Vladimir Gusinsky’s inability to repay a 
loan to Gazprom. 162  Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s imprisonment from 2003 until the end of 2013 
sent a strong message to existing or potential oppositional forces.   His company Yukos had gone 
from a loss making Soviet enterprise to one of the most successful energy companies in the 
world in a matter of a few years, and although most entrepreneurs of Khodorkovsky’s caliber had 
some initially questionable business practices following the mass confusion and ambiguity of the 
transition, at the time of his arrest Yukos maintained a high level of transparency.163 
Stacy Closson sees the source of the problem as “being rooted in the two sides’ different 
objectives for an energy dialogue,” with Russia working toward securing natural gas contracts 
and the EU toward a secure supply.164  She also mentions that because of the variation among 
member states as related to each other and to Russia, that “how Russia views its role in Europe 
likely depends on which ‘Europe’ is under consideration.”165  This exposes the divisions within 
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the EU, whether they are the 27 current members, the ‘old members’ or ‘new members’, the 
members who pay the highest prices, or those who are almost entirely dependent on Russian gas.   
The EU, along with the United States, has attempted to use sanctions to reign in Russia’s 
aggressive diplomacy and expansion, especially in Ukraine.  Beginning with an outcry after 
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych failed to secure closer ties to the EU in the fall of 2013, 
the protests escalated and led eventually to Yanukovych’s flight from Ukraine. The situation then 
deteriorated with the invasion Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, which has been widely viewed 
as an illegitimate reincorporation of Crimea to the Russian Federation.  Ukraine is economically 
and geo-politically important for Russia, serving as a transit state for gas to Europe as well as the 
strategic location on the Black Sea.  Russia has historically given preferential prices for natural 
gas to Ukraine in return for loyalty, but also has used gas to influence the region.166  Though 
Russia attempts to portray itself as the victim in the gas disputes and Ukraine as an unreliable 
transit country, the overwhelming result is that Russia is seen as an unreliable supplier and as 
meddling in the affairs of sovereign nations.167 President Putin held a meeting with his Security 
Council in April 2014, when he addressed the current situation with gas sales to Ukraine stating: 
If we want to be clear about the root of these recent problems, the fact of the 
matter is that Russia cannot continue to bear such a burden all on its own. It was 
for this reason that we appealed to our partners and friends in Europe in the hope 
that we can organise a meeting as soon as possible to work out ways of helping 
and supporting Ukraine's economy. Whoever really does care about Ukraine and 
the Ukrainian people should make their contribution to preventing the country’s 
economy from going bankrupt […] This will take more than handing out pies at 
the Maidan.168 
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The burden he refers to is that since Ukraine failed to pay for gas already delivered, all discounts 
that were based on a full payment of the balance became null and void.  The balance that 
Ukraine should have satisfied by April 7, 2014, was upwards of $540 million.169 
The EU has enacted sanctions due to increased tensions resulting from the crisis in Ukraine and 
the EU’s disapproval of Russia’s role in the invasion and annexation.  Russia in turn banned the 
import of agricultural products from the EU, USA, Canada, Australia, and Norway, including 
meat, dairy, fruits and vegetables, as well as some processed products.  The EU is the most 
impacted by the sanctions due to the fact that they supply 73% of the banned imports.170  In 2013 
EU agricultural exports to Russia amounted to €11.3 billion and these products make up around 
10% of all EU exports to Russia.171  Exports from Lithuania that have been banned amount to 
around €922 million, which is extremely significant because the total agricultural exports are 
€1.374 billion, followed by Poland whose banned exports to Russia are €840 million from a total 
of €1.267 billion.172 
 The EU has enacted some emergency measures to mitigate the impact of the sanctions. 
€155 million was made available to aid in storage, while other farmers were encouraged to 
participate in “withdrawal measures,” which are tactics to avoid over-saturating the market.173  
These include “withdrawal for free distribution” and “green harvesting,” that is harvesting before 
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the produce is ripe, or simply not harvesting the produce at all in order to prevent excess supply 
flooding the market.174 
 Sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU include diplomatic measures, export bans, visa 
restrictions and asset freezes on select individuals and entities, and also a review of EU-Russia 
cooperation programs.  Banned exports include military equipment, arms, oil, and ‘sensitive 
technology.’ The European Council explained this action: 
It is meant as a strong warning: illegal annexation of territory and deliberate 
destabilization of a neighboring sovereign country cannot be accepted in 21st 
century Europe.  Furthermore, when the violence created spirals out of control 
and leads to the killing of almost 300 innocent civilians in their flight from the 
Netherlands to Malaysia, the situation requires urgent and determined response.  
The European Union will fulfill its obligations to protect and ensure the security 
of its citizens. And the European Union will stand by its neighbours and 
partners.175 
 
The financial restrictions imposed by the EU until July 31, 2015 target Russia’s five largest 
banks: Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Rosselkhozbank, and VEB and all entities owned more 
than 50% by these banks.  The EU aims to apply pressure using this financial sanctions, as 
Russian banks depend on selling bonds to EU customers, so restricting this option is intended to 
pressure the Russian Central Bank.176 
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Russia’s Strategy: Energy and Beyond 
In the first several years of his presidency, Vladimir Putin initiated a shift to government 
ownership of the energy sector, mostly through Gazprom acquisitions.  In an authoritative 
manner, he strategically reversed the privatization process of key industries.177   Looking forward 
to 2020, Russia set goals such as increasing gas production, lowering domestic consumption of 
gas partly by raising prices and switching to other hydrocarbons like coal.178  In 2009 Vladimir 
Putin described the objectives for Russia’s energy sector in the document “Russian Federation’s 
Energy Strategy to 2030.”  Russia will aim to meet several targets. As far as gas is concerned, 
Russia plans to diversify exports and expand markets in Japan, Korea, and Asian-Pacific region 
with exports growing from the 0% in 2009 to 20% by 2030, while at the same time decreasing 
gas exports to Europe.179  Russia also expresses concerns related to energy security including: 
the high degree of fixed asset depreciation; the low levels on investment into developing 
Russia’s energy sector; the singular dependence of the Russian economy on natural gas (53%); 
the disparity between the scientific and technical level in the Russian energy sector and at the 
world level performance; and the weak energy infrastructure growth levels in Eastern Siberia and 
the Far East.180  The low economic diversity is one of the most serious issues for Russia, along 
with other economic vulnerabilities, such as the difficulty attracting foreign investors.181  This 
lack of diversity and lack of competition are significant hurdles that will need to be overcome.   
At the same time, the Russian government plans to wean Russia off of its own 
dependence on gas by promoting, supporting, and developing nuclear energy and clean coal 
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energy.182   While the gas production decreases in active sites, Russia plans to conduct 
exploration and extraction at other reserves in Eastern Siberia, the Russian Far East, Yamal 
Peninsula, and the Arctic Shelf, which are projected to provide no less than 16 trillion m3 of 
natural gas.183  Russia must also consider the consequences of becoming overly dependent on 
Central Asian gas, which is has been using to make up for its own decreasing production.184 
Foreign energy relations are also addressed in the outlook to 2030.  One of the main 
problems with the gas industry was listed as the “high transit risks of gas exports to Europe” 
(бысокие транзитные риски экспорта газа в Европу).185  In April 2014, after Russian 
annexation of Crimea, President Putin made it very clear who he feels is to blame for any 
disruptions in gas supply, “We without a doubt guarantee that we will fulfill all of our 
obligations to our European gas customers.  We are not the ones in question.  The real question is 
whether (gas) transit can be ensured through Ukrainian territory.” (Мы, безусловно, 
гарантируем в полном объёме выполнение всех наших обязательств перед нашими 
европейскими потребителями газа. Вопрос не в нас. Вопрос в обеспечении транзита через 
украинскую территорию.)186 He went on to emphasize the importance of stability and security, 
while simultaneously annexing parts of Ukraine, which caused unrest that lead to deaths and 
civil war. Regardless, Putin still makes the following case: 
Stable relations with traditional customers of Russian energy resources and the 
formation of equally stable relations in new energy markets is becoming the most 
important direction of this country’s energy politics in the field of providing 
global energy security in correspondence with national interests. 
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(Стабильные отношения с традиционными потребителями российских 
энергоресурсов и формирование столь же устойчивых отношений на новых 
энергетических рынках являются важнейшими направлениями 
энергетической политики страны в сфере обеспечения глобальной 
энергетической безопасности в соответствии с национальными интересами 
страны.)187 
 
Divide and Conquer 
Another important segment of “Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2030” as related to foreign policy 
includes “the strengthening of the position of the leading Russian energy companies abroad” 
(“[…] укрепление позиций ведущих российских энергетических компаний за рубежом; 
[…].”)188  By process of elimination, this is Gazprom, Russia’s top energy company abroad.  
Gazprom had already become so influential within the EU that it required a formal investigation 
to assess the violation of EU anti-trust and competition law.  How will Gazprom evolve if it is 
forced to operate within the parameters of EU law? Or will it simply continue to establish its 
dominance in Europe, as set out by Russian energy strategy? At the same time, though, Russia 
also states that the 2030 strategy will include the “de-monopolization of the gas market, a 
competitive environment, and establish non-discriminatory rules to allow infrastructure access to 
all,” (демонополизация газового рынка, создание конкурентной среды и установление 
недискриминационных для всех участников правил доступа к его инфраструктуре.)189 
These claims seem to be very different from reality. 
 As the conflict in Ukraine continued without any lasting peace agreements, on June 24, 
2014, President Vladimir Putin met in Vienna with President Heinz Fischer to discuss the South 
Stream project between Austrian state-operated energy company OMV and Gazprom.  The 
purpose of the meeting was to sign the Gazprom-OMV Shareholders agreement, forming the 
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joint company for the Austrian section of South Stream, which will deliver supplies to the 
Central European Gas Hub in Baumgarten, Austria.  They briefly and politely acknowledged the 
conflict in Ukraine, or as President Putin referred to it as “(the) dramatic events in Ukraine,” 
(драматические события на Украине).  The press, though, focused its questioning almost 
entirely on the conflict, and President Putin’s concluding remarks to one journalist were: 
“Of course, we will always protect ethnic Russians in Ukraine, as well as the part 
of the Ukrainian population that identifies not just ethnically, but also culturally 
and linguistically feels a connection to Russia and to the greater Russian world 
(community).”  
 
(Конечно, мы всегда будем защищать и этнических русских на Украине, и 
ту часть украинского населения, украинского народа, которая чувствует 
свою неразрывную не только этническую, но и культурную, языковую связь 
с Россией, чувствует себя частью широкого русского мира.)190 
 
 One member of the press asked a question to President Fischer that is most relevant to the 
entire situation: “Today the agreement on the construction of “South Stream” was signed.  At 
this time, does it give the right sign to bypass Ukraine? And are there any possibilities of 
resolving this problematic issue?” (Сегодня был подписан договор о строительстве 
«Южного потока». Это в данный момент даёт правильный знак, когда обходится 
Украина? И какие есть возможности решения вот этой проблематики?)191  He responded 
beginning with, “everyone with a plan ‘A’, must also have a plan ‘B,” meaning that because the 
EU-backed Nabucco Pipeline fell through, that South Stream was the next best option for 
diversifying pipelines to Europe.  Instead of answering the central ethical question of bypassing 
Ukraine in order to form a joint venture with Russia’s Gazprom, while Russia is annexing 
Ukraine and is under sanctions from the EU, Fischer simply shifted the blame by pointing the 
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finger at Hungary and Bulgaria, two other NATO countries that South Stream will pass through, 
and further justifying the position by explaining that the Austrian segment of South Stream is 
only 2% of the total length.192  Just because Fischer claims that “South Stream, of course, is in 
compliance with the legal framework of the European Union,”193 is it actually ethical to increase 
the threat to energy security to another European country to for the sake of another European 
country?  It appears that Austrian President Fischer prefers to distance himself from the EU and 
the EU sanctions against Russia, as well as distancing himself from any responsibility to aid 
Ukraine, a European neighbor under attack, all in order to maintain warm relations with Russia. 
 President Putin responded incredulously to the question on the topic of bypassing 
Ukraine with the following rationale:  
“The (sole) intent is not to bypass Ukraine.  These projects began long ago. And 
‘Nord Stream,’ it’s what, just another intent to bypass [Ukraine]? No. And how 
about our ‘Blue Stream’ to Turkey beneath the Black Sea, there is such a project, 
it exists, and it works.  Is this also just some sort of intent to put (someone) in a 
difficult position? No, it is simply our direct route to Turkey.” 
 
([…]это не стремление обойти Украину. Эти проекты возникли давно. А 
«Северный поток» – это что, стремление обойти [Украину]? Нет. А наш 
«Голубой поток» на Турцию по дну Чёрного моря, есть такой проект, он 
существует, работает. Это что, стремление кого-то поставить в трудное 
положение? Нет, это просто наши прямые контакты с Турцией.)194  
 
 President Putin is concerned about security and economic stability and development in 
Russia.  The balance is disrupted, though, when in pursuing security and stability for one nation 
the pipeline politics disrupt the security and stability of another.  Moreover, President Putin 
blamed the controversy over Russian gas pipelines to Europe on the United States, which is 
attempting to compete for European gas markets.  Putin claimed that the US has been unhappy 
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with Russian competition and has been stirring up Europe with the idea that Russian gas is 
unreliable since 1962 when the Soviet Union and West Germany signed the “Gas for Pipes” 
deal.195 
 Not even two months after that, Philippe de Villiers, French politician, met with President 
Putin to discuss the creation and dedication of two new parks in Crimea dedicated to “the history 
of Russia and the significance of the Russian soul.” De Villiers even prefaced the meeting by 
saying that while everyone else was busy discussing sanctions, that Russia and France were 
moving forward and signing agreements “which unite the Russian and French sides,–it is the 
symbol of the start of something new” (которая соединит российскую и французскую 
стороны, – это эмблема начала чего-то нового.)196 This is not something new, just another 
instance of European leaders undermining the actions of the Union.  His remarks did not stop at 
solely praising Putin as a wonderful leader, but went so far as to denounce his own European 
compatriots: 
I would like to say, that President Vladimir Putin in the hearts and minds of many 
Europeans is a very highly respected figure, a person, whom most would rather 
emulate, than the majority of European leaders […] We respect the Russian 
Federation and are pleased to cooperate with you.  The future of the Europe is not 
by any means in America, but rather on the European continent, which includes 
Russia.” 
 
(Хочу сказать, что Президент Владимир Путин в сердцах и в душах многих 
европейцев гораздо более уважаемая фигура, человек, которому они хотят 
гораздо больше подражать, чем большинству европейских лидеров и 
руководителей [...]мы уважаем Российскую Федерацию и счастливы 
сотрудничать с вами. Будущее европейского континента находится вовсе не 
в Америке, а на европейском континенте, в том числе в России.)197 
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His criticisms of the EU and the US only continued, even to the point of accusing the EU 
Commissioners of ‘blindly following whatever their American partners dictate.’ 
(что это еврокомиссары из Брюсселя, которые слепо следуют тому, что диктуют им 
американские партнёры.)198 
The following day, Putin met with Finnish President Sauli Niistö in Sochi to discuss their 
bilateral trade agreements.  President Niistö acknowledged that the sanctions had a definite 
impact on the Russian-Finnish trade, which has been growing and reached a total of $19 billion 
in 2013, making Russia Finland’s top trade partner.  Niistö urged Putin to assure that weapons 
from Russia are not ending up in Ukraine and the need for mutual trust in order to achieve a 
ceasefire.199 
 President Putin’s strategy of cultivating bilateral agreements with European nations is 
successful.  The tactic of ‘divide and conquer’ is working in his favor for the time being, though 
the EU has imposed sanctions, these somehow do not seem to prevent major business ventures 
that impact energy security, such as South Stream, to move forward.  Despite the EU’s 
commitments to Ukraine as a fellow European nation, this sentiment breaks down when the 
bilateral talks and agreements with Russia begin.  The EU seems to be leaving Ukraine out in the 
cold once again.   
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CONCLUSION 
CHALLENGES AHEAD FOR THE RUSSIAN-EU ENERGY RELATIONSHIP 
 Since the mid-twentieth century, Russia and Europe have been drawn to one another 
because of energy.  Russia, with its vast reserves of natural resources, was a practical trading 
partner for Europe.  Revenue from energy contributes to Russia’s economic stability, and Europe 
depends on hydrocarbon imports.  The balancing act between dependence and independence 
combined with difficult histories between Russia and Eastern Europe intensifies the debate 
surrounding these multinational energy projects such as Nord Stream, South Stream, and 
Nabucco.   
Poland has been instrumental in impacting EU energy policy since its accession to the 
union in 2004.  Despite these improvements, EU energy policy is uneven and the bilateral energy 
agreements and projects between EU Member States and Russia are sounder than the irresolute 
solidarity between Member States.  Gazprom’s agreements have enacted a ‘divide and conquer’ 
strategy on the EU, which has become overly dependent.  Major EU-Russian oil and gas deals 
have continued despite sanctions against Russia for the invasion and annexation of Ukraine.  Not 
only does that seem to mock the sanctions, but again, it solidifies the speculations that the Union 
may not be able to speak with a unified voice and confirms Günther Oettinger’s fears that one of 
the EU’s greatest threats is the mentality of ‘nation first, community-wide second.’   
The challenges are many.  The EU will undoubtedly continue to struggle for 
‘convergence’ and ‘solidarity’ in energy policy, while Russia will likely continue to pursue an 
aggressive version of diplomacy in the near future.  President Putin leadership style and 
despotism may not be sustainable long-term, though.  Extended sanctions by the United States 
and Europe, combined with recently dropping oil and gas prices may disrupt the Russian 
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economy to a level that Putin cannot persuade or coerce his way out of.  Once the economic 
stability decreases, it is likely that the support of the Russian population will dwindle. Now that 
South Stream has been dropped by Russia as of December 2014, an abrupt new shift in strategy 
is unfolding.200  Ultimately, it will be a face-off between the powers of the EU and the power of 
Putin and his small circle of elites.    
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